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After Larry Squires was injured in a motor vehicle 
accident, his automobile insurer Allstate Property and Casualty 
Insurance Company (“Allstate”) filed an action in the District 
Court seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not obligated to 
pay uninsured motorist (“UM”) benefits to Squires under his 
policy.  Subsequently, in response to Allstate’s motion, the 
Court granted it a judgment on the pleadings on March 2, 2011, 
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as it held that Squires’s injuries did not “arise out of ownership, 
maintenance or use of an uninsured auto” as his policy required 
for Allstate to be liable to him for UM benefits.  For the 
following reasons, we will reverse. 
 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 On October 20, 2008, Squires was driving his pickup 
truck on State Highway 51 in Beaver County, Pennsylvania 
when he was injured after swerving to avoid an approximately 
two-foot square cardboard box lying in the middle of his lane.  
The parties to this action are uncertain as to how the box came 
to be left on the road but, for purposes of its motion in the 
District Court, Allstate stipulated that an unidentified vehicle 
dropped the box.1  Following the accident, Allstate, after 
rejecting Squires’s claim for UM benefits, filed this action and 
Squires responded with counterclaims for breach of contract and 
insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8371 (West 
2007).2
                                                 
1 Squires has contended that another vehicle must have dropped 
the box because at the time of the accident he was traveling on a 
limited access highway with no adjacent sidewalks or other 
means of pedestrian access. 
  Allstate then moved for judgment on the pleadings and 
 
2 Neither party contends that the matter in dispute should be 
resolved by way of the arbitration procedure for resolution of 




for dismissal of the counterclaims. 
 Squires’s policy provides, in relevant part: 
[W]e [Allstate] will pay damages to an insured 
person [Squires] for bodily injury which an 
insured person is legally entitled to recover from 
the owner or operator of an uninsured auto.  
Bodily injury must be caused by accident and 
arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of 
an uninsured auto. 
App. at 44.  The policy’s language tracks the Pennsylvania 
Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”), 
which requires that insurers offer UM benefits in motor vehicle 
liability insurance policies.3
                                                 
3 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1731(a) (West 2006) provides:   
  The MVFRL provides for 
 
(a) Mandatory offering.—No motor vehicle 
liability insurance policy shall be delivered or 
issued for delivery in this Commonwealth, with 
respect to any motor vehicle registered or 
principally garaged in this Commonwealth, unless 
uninsured motorist and underinsured motorist 
coverages are offered therein or supplemental 
thereto in amounts as provided in [75 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann.] section 1734 (relating to request for 
lower limits of coverage).  Purchase of uninsured 




“uninsured motorist coverage” as follows:  
Uninsured motorist coverage shall provide 
protection for persons who suffer injury arising 
out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle 
and are legally entitled to recover damages 
therefor from owners or operators of uninsured 
motor vehicles. 
75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1731(b) (West 2006).   The MVFRL 
defines “uninsured motor vehicle” to include, inter alia
An unidentified motor vehicle that causes an 
accident resulting in injury provided the accident 
is reported to the police or proper governmental 
authority and the claimant notifies his insurer 
within 30 days, or as soon as practicable 
thereafter, that the claimant or his legal 




 Although Squires’s insurance policy -- unlike the 
MVFRL-- does not include unidentified motor vehicles in its 
definition of “uninsured auto,” 
 § 1702.   
see
                                                                                                             
 
 app. at 45, Allstate did not 
dispute -- and the District Court, quite reasonably in view of 
section 1702, assumed -- that the unidentified vehicle was an 





  Accordingly, the sole issue that the Court decided 
was “whether an accident caused by a box which fell from an 
uninsured motor vehicle can be attributed, as a matter of law, to 
the ‘ownership, maintenance or use’ of an automobile.”  App. at 
5.  The Court answered this question in the negative, concluding 
that there is UM coverage for policies containing the “arising 
out of” language only when a vehicle -- and not some other 
object such as the box -- was “the instrumentality causing . . . 
the [a]ccident.” App. at 11.  Accordingly, on March 2, 2011, the 
Court granted Allstate’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
denied its motion to dismiss the counterclaims as moot, and 
dismissed Squires’s counterclaims as moot.  Squires timely 
appealed. 
 
                                                 
4 Though the District Court did not directly address the question 
of whether the policy’s language or the MVFRL controlled its 
coverage analysis, in Pennsylvania “[i]nsurance contracts are 
presumed to have been made with reference to substantive law, 
including applicable statutes in force, and such laws enter into 
and form a part of the contractual obligation as if actually 
incorporated into the contract.”  Clairton City Sch. Dist. v. 
Mary, 541 A.2d 849, 851 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (citing First 
Nat’l Bank of Pa. v. Flanagan, 528 A.2d 134 (Pa. 1987)).  
Accordingly, we refer to both Squires’s policy and the MVFRL 





III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
 The District Court had diversity of citizenship subject 
matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.5  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary 
review over the District Court’s grant of Allstate’s motion for 
judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).  See 
Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 593 n.2 (3d Cir. 
2010).  A court will grant a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings if the movant establishes that “there are no issues of 
material fact, and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.”  Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 220 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (citing Soc’y Hill Civic Ass’n v. Harris, 632 F.2d 
1045, 1054 (3d Cir. 1980)).  In considering a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, a court must accept all of the 
allegations in the pleadings of the party against whom the 
motion is addressed as true and draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the non-moving party.  See Allah v. Al-Hafeez
 
, 226 
F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2000). 
                                                 
5 At oral argument, Squires’s counsel tentatively represented 
that the limit of Squires’s UM coverage was $50,000, a 
possibility that led us to question whether the District Court had 
diversity jurisdiction as it appeared that the case might not 
satisfy section 1332’s requirement that the amount in 
controversy exceed $75,000.   However, after oral argument 
counsel for the parties advised us that Squires’s insurance policy 




 The parties agree that Pennsylvania law governs our 
interpretation of Squires’s policy and thus the extent to which it 
provides coverage, and therefore we apply Pennsylvania law on 
this appeal.  Under Pennsylvania law, 
the interpretation of a contract of insurance is a 
matter of law for the courts to decide.  In 
interpreting an insurance contract, we must 
ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by 
the language of the written agreement.  When the 
policy language is clear and unambiguous, we 
will give effect to the language of the contract. 
Paylor v. Hartford Ins. Co., 640 A.2d 1234, 1235 
(Pa. 1994).  However, where the policy language 
is ambiguous, it “is to be construed in favor of the 
insured and against the insurer, the drafter of the 
agreement.”  Dorohovich v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 589 
A.2d 252, 256 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).  In an 
insurance policy, “[w]ords of common usage . . . 
are to be construed in their natural, plain, and 
ordinary sense . . . and we may inform our 
understanding of these terms by considering their 
dictionary definitions.”  Madison Constr. Co. v. 
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co.
 As the District Court recognized, the sole question in this 
case is whether under the policy and Pennsylvania law Squires’s 
, 735 A.2d 100, 108 
(Pa. 1999) (citations omitted). 
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accident should be regarded as having “[arisen] out of 
ownership, maintenance, or use of an uninsured auto.”  We note 
that to the extent “the state’s highest court has not addressed the 
precise question presented, we must predict how [that] court 
would resolve the issue.” Wayne Moving & Storage of N.J., Inc. 
v. Sch. Dist. of Phila.
we must look to decisions of state intermediate 
appellate courts, of federal courts interpreting that 
state’s law, and of other state supreme courts that 
have addressed the issue, as well as to analogous 
decisions, considered dicta, scholarly works, and 
any other reliable data tending convincingly to 
show how the highest court in the state would 
decide the issue at hand. 
, 625 F.3d 148, 154 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(alterations and citations omitted).   In doing so,  
Meyer v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc’y, 648 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 
2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
“Although not dispositive, decisions of state intermediate 
appellate courts should be accorded significant weight in the 
absence of an indication that the highest state court would rule 
otherwise.”  Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 
1373 n.15 (3d Cir. 1996).   Although Pennsylvania’s 
intermediate appellate courts have not addressed a factual 
scenario similar to that presented here, their decisions provide 
significant guidance for us in answering the question that we 
address.6
                                                 
6 The cases we cite show that the question of whether an 




  We start, however, with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
case of Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Co. v. Goodville 
Mutual Casualty Co., 170 A.2d 571 (Pa. 1961), in which that 
court held that “[c]onstrued strictly against the insurer, ‘arising 
out of’ [in an insurance policy] means causally connected with, 
not proximately caused by.  ‘But for’ causation, i.e. a cause and 
result relationship, is enough to satisfy this provision of the 
policy.”  Id. at 573.   This formulation of “arising out of” is now 
well-settled in Pennsylvania, and has been applied in various 
insurance law settings, both when interpreting insurance policies 
and assessing issues arising by operation of statutes, even 
though some of the cases applying the formulation do not cite 
Goodville.  See, e.g., Tuscarora Wayne Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Kadlubosky, 889 A.2d 557, 563 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (assessing 
a commercial general liability insurance policy); Roman Mosaic 
& Tile v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 704 A.2d 665, 669 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1997) (same); Smith v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 
572 A.2d 785, 787 (Pa. Super Ct. 1990) (applying the Goodville 
formulation to an uninsured motorist policy provision); Erie Ins. 
Exch. v. Eisenhuth, 451 A.2d 1024, 1025 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) 
(no-fault automobile insurance policy).  Accordingly, Squires at 
this time only need have alleged adequately that the unidentified 
vehicle’s use was a but-for cause of his injuries.7
                                                                                                             
motor vehicle come from numerous different factual situations 
and thus inevitably will be factually distinguishable. 
 
 
7 We are not implying that in order to recover on his UM 
coverage Squires will not be required ultimately to show that an 
uninsured vehicle proximately caused the accident.  But at this 
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 In making our analysis we are aware that Pennsylvania 
intermediate appellate courts quite broadly have indicated that if 
injuries are caused by “an instrumentality or external force other 
than the motor vehicle itself,” the vehicle will not be regarded as 
having contributed to the cause of the injuries pursuant to the 
“arising out of” language.  See Lucas-Raso v. Am. Mfrs. Ins. 
Co., 657 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).  For example, in 
Lucas-Raso the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held in a 
workers’ compensation subrogation action that an employee’s 
injuries did not arise from the maintenance or use of a motor 
vehicle when the employee slipped in a snow-covered pothole as 
she was approaching her car.  Accordingly, a provision of the 
MVFRL, 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1720 (West 2006), that bars 
subrogation claims in cases “arising out of the maintenance or 
use of a motor vehicle” did not preclude the workers’ 
compensation insurance carrier that had paid benefits to the 
employee from subrogating to the recovery on the employee’s 
third-party claims for damages arising from the fall.  Id. at 5.  
The court acknowledged that while the employee was “vehicle-
oriented at the time of her fall, she has failed to establish the 
necessary nexus between her injury and the use of the . . . 
vehicle,” observing that the employee had “offered no 
connection to link her fall to the use of her vehicle other than 
her claim that she was en route to enter it.  The facts illustrate 
that it was not the act of entering her vehicle which caused [the] 
fall, and there was no other vehicle involved to break the chain 
of entry.”  Id.
                                                                                                             
stage of this case he only need satisfy the requirement to plead 
facts that could support a conclusion that the unidentified 
vehicle was a but-for cause of the accident. 
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 The Superior Court employed reasoning similar to that of 
Lucas-Raso in Smith v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 572 
A.2d 785, a case on which the District Court in this case heavily 
relied.  In Smith a boy was riding his bicycle on a road as a 
tractor pulling a hay wagon passed by him.  As the vehicles were 
passing, a boy riding in the wagon threw hay in the bicycle 
rider’s face, causing him to crash into a tree and suffer serious 
injuries.  Smith and his parents sued their automobile liability 
insurer seeking uninsured motorist coverage, but the court held 
that the injuries were not caused by a vehicle, but rather by the 
“intentional act of a third party, [i.e.] the passenger, throwing 
hay.”8   Id. at 787.  Accordingly, the court held that “[b]ecause 
we are unable to discern any causal connection between the 
vehicle and the injury, the injury cannot be said to arise from the 
ownership, maintenance, or use of the vehicle,” and therefore 
the plaintiffs were not entitled to uninsured motorist benefits 
under their policy.  
 Relying on 
Id. 
Smith, the District Court rejected Squires’s 
claim for coverage as it concluded that “the determinative fact is 
that the instrumentality causing the Underlying Accident was a 
box -- not a vehicle.”9  App. at 11.  We think, however, that 
Smith
                                                 
8 During the time that the hay wagon was on the road it was 
regarded as an uninsured vehicle. 
 is distinguishable from this case, and, when faced with a 
set of facts similar to those here, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would hold that Squires’s accident arose “out of the 
 
9 The District Court also cited two not precedential opinions but 
we do not discuss them as we afford them no weight. 
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ownership, maintenance, or use of an uninsured auto.”  As 
Squires points out, Smith concerned the intentional intervening 
act of a third party: a person throwing hay from the back of a 
vehicle.  Hence, in line with Goodville’s emphasis on causation 
in fact, the Smith court held that “it is clear that the injury was 
not caused by the vehicle, but by the boy intentionally throwing 
hay in Smith’s face.”  Smith, 572 A.2d at 787.  The court noted 
that it had “interpreted the phrase ‘maintenance and use of a 
motor vehicle’ to mean the ‘maintenance or use of a motor 
vehicle as a vehicle, including, incident to its maintenance or 
use as a vehicle, occupying, entering into, or alighting from 
it[.]”  Id. (quoting Camacho v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 460 A.2d 
353, 354 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)) (emphasis in original).  In 
Squires’s case, in contrast to the incidental involvement of the 
vehicle in the boy’s injury in Smith, we will infer that the 
unidentified vehicle directly was involved in the accident as it 
was transporting the box as cargo -- a common use for many 
types of vehicles traveling on a roadway.  See 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 102 (West 2006) (Motor Vehicle Code definitions 
section defining “vehicle” as “[e]very device in, upon or by 
which any person or property is or may be transported . . . .”) 
(emphasis added).   Thus, when the unidentified vehicle dropped 
the cardboard box, it had more than an “incidental involvement . 
. . in the situation that gave rise to [Squires’s] injuries.”  See 
Alvarino v. Allstate Ins. Co., 537 A.2d 18, 21 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1988).10
                                                 
10 Squires’s case would have been indistinguishable from Smith 
if in Smith the hay had been insufficiently secured while being 
transported and consequently flew off the wagon and hit the 
bicycle rider.  In that situation the nexus between the “use” of 
  Rather, the accident was a direct consequence of the 
 
 14 
use of the vehicle for its intended purpose, for as is sometimes 
said in another context, things “fall off the truck.”     
 We have examined the four cases on which Smith 
principally relied but find them to be easily distinguishable from 
this case as they all concerned intervening actions in situations 
in which the injuries sustained were not attributable to common 
uses of a vehicle.  See Roach v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty., 
550 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that a bus 
passenger who was injured as a result of a fight between two 
other passengers did not “establish the requisite causal 
connection between the ‘maintenance and use of a motor 
vehicle’ and the injuries”); Alvarino, 537 A.2d at 21 (holding 
that a passenger who was bitten by a dog chained inside a van 
did not suffer injuries arising out of the maintenance or use of a 
motor vehicle, because the motor vehicle was merely “the place 
where injuries [were] sustained”); Camacho, 460 A.2d at 354 
(holding that injuries sustained by driver sitting in car caused by 
an explosive device that was thrown from another vehicle did 
not arise out of the use of the other vehicle); Schweitzer v. 
Aetna Life and Cas. Co., 452 A.2d 735, 738-39 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1982) (denying coverage for a claimant who was pulled from 
her vehicle and assaulted, because neither she nor her assailant 
was “acting in the role of motorist,” and “an assault by an armed 
assailant upon the driver of a car [is not] the type of conduct that 
is reasonably identifiable with the use of a car”) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Ohio Cas. Grp. 
of Ins. Cos. v. Bakaric
                                                                                                             
the wagon and the accident would have been much stronger than 
it actually was in Smith.   
, 513 A.2d 462, 465 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) 
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(refusing to interpret an incident where a husband shot his wife 
in the face in the front seat of a car as one arising from the use 
of a motor vehicle);  Eisenhuth, 451 A.2d at 1025 (holding that 
injuries suffered by a vehicle passenger as the result of a 
gunshot did not satisfy Goodville’s causation-based standard for 
“arising out of”);  Day v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.
 In support of its position, Allstate points to our decision 
in 
, 396 A.2d 3, 
5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (holding that injuries sustained in a post-
collision fistfight between two drivers did not arise out of the 
ownership, maintenance, or use of a vehicle for purposes of 
assessing uninsured motorist coverage). 
U.S. Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Co., 80 F.3d 90 (3d Cir. 1996).  In U.S. Underwriters, Robert 
Hipl parked his car at a nursing home in preparation for a 
business meeting.  As he exited his vehicle, Hipl slipped on 
grease that had come from the nursing home’s kitchen and then 
coated a section of the parking lot.  Id. at 92.  In the process, he 
struck his back on the car’s door and was injured.  Id.  After 
Hipl’s employer’s workers’ compensation carrier paid him 
benefits, it asserted that it had acquired a subrogation lien on the 
proceeds of a third-party action Hipl brought against the nursing 
home and other defendants.  Id.  Following the settlement of the 
third-party action, the third-party defendants’ insurers sought to 
invalidate the lien under the provision of the MVFRL involved 
in Lucas-Raso that bars a workers’ compensation insurer’s right 
of subrogation to recover benefits from an insured’s tort 
recovery if the injuries “arose from the maintenance or use of a 
motor vehicle.”  Id.  We applied Goodville’s “but-for” 
formulation of “arising out of,” but, noting that “every incidental 
factor that arguably contributes to an accident is not a ‘but for’ 
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cause in the legal sense,” see Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough, 43 
A. 240, 240 (Pa. 1899), we cited Smith and several similar 
intermediate appellate court cases and concluded that a 
Pennsylvania court would not hold that Hipl’s injuries “arose 
out of” the use of his car based on the particular facts of the 
case.  Id.
 
 at 94-95. 
U.S. Underwriters clearly is distinguishable from this 
case.  We first observe that while, as here, something physically 
external to a vehicle caused the injuries in U.S. Underwriters as 
the grease that directly caused Hipl to fall emanated from a 
nearby building, the procedural posture of our case requires us 
to consider that the cardboard box that caused the accident was 
dropped on the road by an unidentified and thus uninsured 
vehicle.  Consequently, there is a stronger factual causal 
connection here between the injuries sustained and the 
“ownership, maintenance, or use” of an automobile than the 
connection between the injuries and the vehicle in U.S. 
Underwriters.  In U.S. Underwriters we recognized how 
attenuated the causal connection was between the injury and the 
vehicle for in reaching our result we relied on the analogous 
case of Lucas-Raso
Presently, appellant, who intended to enter her 
automobile, claims she stumbled after stepping 
into a snow-covered pothole and was injured as a 
result.  She has failed to show how her vehicle 
contributed to her fall. Clearly, if appellant had 
encountered the same snow-covered pothole in a 
different location in the parking lot, this case 
would not be before us. Appellant has offered no 
, which reasoned: 
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connection to link her fall to the use of her vehicle 
other than her claim that she was en route to enter 
it.  The facts illustrate that it was not the act of 
entering her vehicle which caused appellant’s fall, 
and there was no other vehicle involved to break 
the chain of entry. 
 Lucas-Raso, 657 A.2d at 5.  Although Hipl, unlike the injured 
party in Lucas-Raso, struck his vehicle rather than the ground 
when he fell, a vehicle did not cause the fall.  Thus, though the 
vehicle involved in U.S. Underwriters was the situs of the 
injury, its presence was not instrumental in the fall.  
Significantly, in U.S. Underwriters we examined  “Pennsylvania 
cases demontrat[ing] that the Commonwealth’s understanding of 
‘use of a motor vehicle’ . . . will not encompass the causal nexus 
at issue here,” 80 F.3d at 94, citing Smith, Roach, Alvarino, 
Camacho, Schweitzer, and Eisenhuth, which as we have 
mentioned were all cases where the presence of a vehicle was 
merely incidental to the conditions that caused the injuries at 
issue.  See id.
 As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania set forth in 
 at 94-95. 
Goodville, the central inquiry in assessing whether an incident 
“arose out of the maintenance, ownership, or use” of a motor 
vehicle concerns causation, which is informed by -- but does not 
necessarily turn on -- the “instrumentality” directly causing the 
accident.  Thus, the Pennsylvania intermediate appellate court 
decisions that have indicated that if “an instrumentality or 
external force other than the motor vehicle itself” caused the 
accident the vehicle will not be regarded as having contributed 
to its cause may not have precisely applied the Goodville 
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formulation.  In fact, we think that while the identification of the 
object that directly caused an accident surely is relevant in a 
causation analysis, it is not dispositive and does not foreclose 
the possibility that the accident arose out of the use of a motor 
vehicle.  In this regard, we point out that there may be two or 
even more causes of an accident.  Lehrer/McGovern v. Workers’ 
Compensation Appeal Board, 720 A.2d 853 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1998), is an example of a case in which there was a confluence 
of an external object and a vehicle that caused an accident.  In 
that case a construction worker was injured when a metal refuse 
container slid off of a nearby flatbed truck and traveled about 
ten feet before hitting a large steel box that struck the worker.  
Id. at 853-54.  The worker filed a third-party action against the 
truck owner, and after the parties settled that action, his 
employer, who had paid its employee workers’ compensation 
benefits, filed a subrogation action seeking to make a recovery 
from the employee’s proceeds from the third-party action.  Id. at 
854.  However, as we already have noted in our discussions of 
Lucas-Raso and U.S. Underwriters, a provision of the MVFRL 
precludes an employer or insurance company that has paid 
workers’ compensation benefits from subrogating to the 
recovery from a third-party action “arising out of the 
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.”  In affirming the 
Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, which rejected the 
employer’s claim, the Commonwealth Court held that the 
worker’s injuries arose from the maintenance or use of a motor 
vehicle, and barred the employer from subrogating to the 
recovery in the third-party action, despite the circumstance as 
germane here that an object other than the vehicle itself struck 
the worker.   Id. at 856.   
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 In a case similar to Lehrer/McGovern insofar as that case 
involves an issue comparable to the issue here, the court in Fox 
v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co., 461 A.2d 299 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1983), faced a situation involving a plaintiff who was 
injured after tripping over debris left when a car suddenly 
crashed into her living room.  In deciding that the plaintiff 
qualified as a “victim” under an insurance policy issued 
pursuant to the Pennsylvania No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance 
Act, the court determined that the causal connection between the 
vehicle and the plaintiff’s injuries was strong enough to support 
a conclusion that the accident “arose out of” the maintenance 
and use of the vehicle.  Id. at 302.   Lehrer/McGovern and Fox
 We finally note that “the MVFRL is to be liberally 
construed in order to afford the greatest possible coverage to 
injured claimants” and “[i]n close or doubtful insurance cases, a 
court should resolve the meaning of insurance policy provisions 
or legislative intent in favor of coverage for the insured.”  
, 
cases that in our view describe cause-and-result relationships 
which, if anything, were more attenuated than the causal 
connection between the use of a vehicle and the accident here, 
demonstrate that physical contact with an uninsured vehicle is 
not required for an accident to “arise out of” the use of an 
uninsured vehicle, and that, depending on the facts of the case, 
some less direct causal relationship sometimes will suffice.   
Accepting for purposes of this appeal that the unidentified 
vehicle that dropped the box on the highway was an “uninsured” 
vehicle, there is a sufficient causal connection for us to 
determine that Squires’s injuries “arose out of” the use of a 
vehicle under his insurance policy.   
Houston v. SEPTA, 19 A.3d 6, 14 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) 
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(citing 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1928(c) (West 1998) (stating 
with exceptions inapplicable here that statutes “shall be liberally 
construed to effect their objects and promote justice”)); Motley 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 466 A.2d 609, 611 (Pa. 
1983)).  Thus, even though we recognize that this case is close, 
we think that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would reach the 
result that we reach.11
    
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that in light of 
Allstate’s concession for purposes of its motion for judgment on 
the pleadings that the accident was caused by a box dropped 
from an unidentified vehicle, Squires’s accident “ar[ose] out of 
the maintenance, ownership, or use” of an uninsured vehicle 
                                                 
11 We emphasize how narrow our opinion is.  After all, we have 
decided this case on the basis of an assumed set of facts and it is 
entirely possible that in further proceedings whether in court or 
in an arbitration case the facts may appear to be quite different.  
Moreover, though we are reinstating Squires’s counterclaims we 
are not suggesting that in this close case we see any merit in 
Squires’s bad faith counterclaim.  Rather, we express no opinion 
on that issue as it is not before us for adjudication.  We note, 
however, that our experience in addressing Pennsylvania 
insurance coverage disputes has demonstrated that insureds tend 
to bring bad faith claims when insurers reject their claims even 




under his insurance policy.  We therefore will reverse the 
District Court’s order of March 2, 2011, granting Allstate’s 
motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing Squires’s 
counterclaims and will remand the case to the District Court for 
further proceedings. 
